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Fatality Sensitivity
Factors Shaping British, Polish and 
Australian Public Opinion on the 
2003 Iraq War 
Piotr Lis
This paper investigates fatality sensitivity of public opinion in coalition 
countries that participate in war efforts but are not a leading force. The 
analysis is based on opinion polls measuring public attitudes towards 
the involvement in the Iraq war of three countries: the United King-
dom, Poland and Australia. Overall, the data does not provide clear evi-
dence of sensitivity to soldier deaths, which were relatively infrequent, 
but the war opposition appears to increase in response to terrorism 
in Iraq. News of success has a power to reduce war opposition, while 
scandals are costly in terms of public support.
Key words: Iraq war, wartime public opinion, fatality sensitivity, war 
coalition members.
Introduction
This article analyses the attitudes of public opinion in three coalition 
countries, the United Kingdom, Poland and Australia, towards their in-
volvement in the Iraq war and how it responded to war-related events 
such as soldier and civilian deaths. Although the dynamics shaping 
war-time opinion in countries that play only a supporting role in a 
conflict are likely to be different from those typical for a coalition lead-
er, they have not received much attention in existing literature. This 
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is in spite of the fact that a decision to commit armed forces to war 
is among the most vital decisions any government can take. Military 
operations require public support because it is the citizenry who pays 
the price of war with their lives, health and taxes. Thus, knowledge of 
factors influencing public opinion is central to providing and sustain-
ing support for government actions. It gives policy makers indications 
into what is permissible and intolerable from a political point of view. 
Consequently, a study of public opinion regarding armed conflict is 
important from both academic and political perspectives. 
The war in Iraq, which began on 20 March 2003, occupied news ser-
vices and national agendas of many countries for several years, and to 
this day polarises opinions. The invasion led by the United States was 
justified by the claims of Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and the perceived threat of Saddam Hussein’s re-
gime to America and her allies. The swift invasion rid the world of a 
gory dictatorship, however it was soon followed by a bloody insurgen-
cy which within seven years claimed the lives of over 100,000 civilians1 
and 4,700 coalition soldiers.2 The Multi-National Force, henceforth 
MNF, which became responsible for military operations in the country 
after the initial invasion, included troops from nearly 40 countries and 
at its peak comprised 176,000 personnel.3 However, only four countries 
participated directly in the major combat phase, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia and Poland, and as such were active in 
Iraq from March 2003.4 While war-time attitudes of American public 
opinion have received significant attention from researchers,5 little is 
known about determinants of war-related opinion in coalition coun-
tries, i.e. those that are not a core force behind military operations but 
contribute troops to support a combat mission initiated and led by an-
other country. To fill in the existing research gap, the focus of this arti-
cle is on the British, Polish and Australian public opinion towards the 
countries’ participation in the Iraq war. These three coalition forces, 
although only a fraction of the numbers deployed by the United States, 
were among the largest sent by the MNF members.6 Their role was 
further emphasized by granting them command of two multinational 
divisions: South-East to Great Britain and Central-South to Poland. 
This study hypothesizes that the patterns governing such opinion 
differ from those typical for coalition leaders. The possible reasons 
behind dissimilar reactions to events in the theatre of war stem from 
the very different degree of political and military involvement. These 
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countries only support the ongoing operations and therefore their re-
sponsibility and risks are lesser than those of a coalition leader. Their 
withdrawal from combat is unlikely to have a pivotal impact on the 
war outcome and the consequences of such a move would be most-
ly limited to strained relationships with the coalition leader, i.e. the 
United States in the case of the Iraq war. Regardless of the supporting 
forces’ performance, international condemnation in the event of fail-
ure is likely to concentrate mostly on the coalition leader. This way, 
even if the Iraq war was lost, the blame would be placed largely on the 
United States, not other MNF members. Being in such a “comfortable” 
situation, governments and citizenry of the supporting states may see 
a larger divergence between their national interests and the war oper-
ations. Not being a superpower, smaller countries are unlikely to feel 
and act like a “world’s policeman” and their interest in global politics 
may be of a narrower scope than that of the United States. For instance, 
Poland and Australia did not have traditions of large combat missions 
aimed at conquering remote regions or regime changes. Furthermore, 
the two countries were not exposed to international terrorism as much 
as the United States and Great Britain,7 therefore their gains from top-
pling a terrorism-supporting regime should be relatively smaller. The 
need for research into the public opinion of war supporting states is 
further aggravated by the fact that previous studies characterize con-
flicts by the patterns of accumulation of U.S. soldier deaths.8 Because 
of a smaller size and a different nature of deployment, the number of 
deaths is likely to grow differently among the coalition troops. For in-
stance, the death toll among American soldiers amounted to 2.5 per-
cent of the country’s maximum deployment in the post-invasion pe-
riod. The corresponding number for the United Kingdom and Poland 
was approximately 1 percent, and it was negligible for Australia.9 This 
difference is an outcome of the fact that soldiers from the countries in 
question were likely to participate in less dangerous operations, and 
Australian troops were kept from life threatening actions.10 
This divergence of objectives, degree of involvement as well as rel-
atively lower cost in terms of soldier deaths are likely to focus public 
opinion in coalition states on other signals of war progress. In addition 
to responding to losses of national troops, which represent a direct cost 
of war to a nation but occur at low frequency for the coalition mem-
bers, it is hypothesised that the public is sensitive to instability and the 
severity of terrorism in Iraq. The latter is considered as a measure of 
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war progress, where more violence signals failing efforts. Such reason-
ing is in line with the cost-benefit decision making framework, where 
the public is supposed to consider both sides of the equation before 
forming their opinion. Thus, the study’s efforts are concentrated on 
determining the degree to which public opinion in coalition countries 
responds to own soldier deaths as well as instability in Iraq measured 
by the number of terrorist attacks and resulting deaths. 
This study employs the error correction model (ECM) to analyse 
how the war opinion is influenced by combat deaths and the magni-
tude of terrorism in Iraq. This method offers two considerable advan-
tages. First, it tackles the problems of non-stationarity which plague 
opinion and fatality series. Second, it has a long memory and a shock 
in one period is allowed to affect time series throughout subsequent 
periods. It is expected that an increased fatality rate in one period rais-
es war opposition. Although in subsequent periods the death toll may 
be much lower, the public may be influenced by the memory of ear-
lier events and unwilling to scale down their opposition to the level 
suggested by the smaller death rate in the most recent time interval. 
In other words, an effect of a jump in fatality series on war opinion is 
likely to take more than one period to die out. 
The empirical analysis returns results consistent with the expec-
tations. However, the significant positive impact of soldier deaths on 
war opposition can be confirmed only for the United Kingdom. The 
lack of similar effects in Poland and Australia might be attributed 
to a relatively small number of soldier fatalities leaving the opinion 
dominated by other factors, including terrorism in Iraq. The public 
in all three countries appear to be sensitive to the information on the 
number of people killed in terrorist attacks. The Poles, who were high-
ly antagonistic to the war at its onset, significantly reduced their op-
position after the invasion ended in May 2003. This could have been 
helped by the fact that the country did not incur any human losses 
during the first two months of the war and the benefit of defeating 
the brutal dictatorship seemed to have been achieved at a small cost. 
The British public responded in a similar manner after the capture of 
Saddam Hussein, which must have been perceived as a war success. 
The opposition in both countries sharply increased after the release of 
the torture pictures from Abu Ghraib. Here, however, part of the effect 
may have come from the Madrid bombings, which happened within 
the same polling period. Surprisingly, there appear to be no significant 
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effects of the London bombings of 7 July 2005 on the British war op-
position. 
The results of this article may be interpreted as a policy-relevant 
guidance for governments considering involvement in a multinational 
war coalition. In particular, it identifies the channels that affect the 
war-related views of the citizenry, and therefore should become a fo-
cus of policy makers’ attention. For example, it confirms that scandals 
such as torture in Abu Ghraib prison are very costly in terms of public 
attitude and their effect is difficult to reverse. It also shows that the 
public is responsive to deaths of Iraqis suffered from terrorism. Hence, 
maintaining war support requires an effective stability-promoting and 
counter-terrorist strategy as a part of the war effort. This implication 
is important also for the coalition leader, the United States, in whose 
interest it is to maintain positive war attitudes among the public across 
the coalition in order to keep allies committed to a military interven-
tion. 
The reminder of this article is organized as follows. The next section 
offers literature review. The ensuing two sections present data sources 
and properties, which are then followed by the discussion of the esti-
mation method and results. The final two sections offer discussion and 
concluding remarks.
Literature review
Existing literature pays the most attention to reactions of the American 
public to the use of the armed forces. A pioneering study on the topic 
uses the “log of cumulative soldier deaths” (the natural logarithm of the 
total number of casualties that have occurred at the time of a survey) 
to analyze public attitudes to the Korean and Vietnam wars.11 Its main 
finding, that the war support drops in proportion to the “log of cumu-
lative fatalities,” leads to the conclusion that the American public are 
sensitive to relatively small losses in early stages of war, but only to large 
losses in later stages. This is contested by other researchers who empha-
size the importance of accounting for war weariness (a duration-based 
opposition).12 Including controls for conflict duration leads to a conclu-
sion that the level of marginal fatalities has better explanatory power 
than cumulative fatalities when marginal fatalities are increasing; when 
they are decreasing, the log of cumulative fatalities performs better. 
Numerous studies seek an explanation to changes in war support 
in factors other than casualties. For example, public support for con-
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flict has been linked to the principal policy objectives, which posit that 
the public may be less sensitive to fatalities in certain types of military 
interventions.13 The “elite cue theory” on the other hand suggests that 
support for conflict is shaped by a degree of consensus or divergence 
in elites’ opinions regarding the war and when political leaders share 
their support for the conflict, the public tends to support it too.14 A lack 
of consensus brings a polarisation effect which is demonstrated by a 
split in the public opinion. The influences of the principal policy ob-
jectives and elite cues are assumed to be complemented by the nature 
of media coverage of a conflict. There is also evidence indicating that 
Americans are more likely to support military actions if they are a part 
of a multilateral operation.15 
The drop in the American public support for the Iraq war appeared 
faster than during the wars in Vietnam and Korea, which could be ex-
plained by the public perception of the stakes in Iraq being less import-
ant than during the former conflicts.16 Another early study of the pub-
lic opinion towards the Iraq war considers the influence of American 
fatalities on the presidential rating. The impact of soldier deaths on 
presidential approval is shown to vary between the stages of the war, 
nonetheless, expectations of success of the mission are argued to have 
a much stronger impact on president’s popularity than war casualties.17 
These conclusions should be taken with caution for a number of rea-
sons. First, the study covers only the first 20 months of the war, thus 
the observed patterns may be misrepresentative for its whole dura-
tion. Second, since news services tend to report the cumulative death 
counts from the beginning of the war, it is unreasonable to expect the 
public to form their opinion for respective phases separately. Third, 
using presidential ratings is problematic as they are influenced by nu-
merous factors and it is difficult to extract a pure war component.18 
Nonetheless, a comprehensive study of fatality sensitivity across a 
sample of conflicts reinforces the conclusion that American public is 
“defeat phobic, not casualty phobic.”19
All the research cited above focuses on U.S. public opinion and there 
have been very few studies that link war casualties to the war support 
or opposition in the three coalition countries in question. The avail-
able literature discusses British public opinion and concentrates most-
ly on the Falklands war of 1982. What all these studies have in com-
mon is that they look at the popularity of the governing party, not the 
public support for war. Moreover, they tend to model the war period 
96
CEJISS 
1/2018 
with indicator variables, and hence do not account for the intensity of 
the conflict and its human costs.20 In a recent attempt, attitudes of the 
British public towards the involvement in Libya in 2011 have been an-
alyzed and compared with attitudes in other countries as well as those 
towards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, the purely de-
scriptive approach of that study does not permit drawing generalizable 
conclusions on potential determinants of the war-time opinion.21 
This article is closest to the work of Mueller and Gartner and Se-
gura22 as it identifies the human cost of war as a chief determinant of 
public opinion. However, it uses a more efficient estimation method 
which deals with problems typical for opinion poll and fatality series. 
It also allows the public to react to deaths incurred by citizens of the 
invaded country.
Data
The data are drawn from several sources. The information on the op-
position to the Iraq war was collected from three pollsters, YouGov, 
CBOS and Roy Morgan for the United Kingdom, Poland and Austra-
lia, respectively.23 The choice of the opposition scores as a dependent 
variable is motivated by governments being chiefly concerned with 
avoiding political sanctions for their military endeavors, and less with 
maintaining war support.24 The British were asked the following ques-
tion: “Do you think the United States and Britain are/were right or 
wrong to take military action against Iraq?”, forty times between 18 
March 2003 and 7 June 2007 (see Panel 1 of Figure 1).  Approximately 
2,000 respondents took part in the survey, which was conducted with 
varying frequency.  In 2003 and 2004, when the Iraq war dominated 
public debate, YouGov carried out 22 and 11 polls, respectively. In 2005 
the number fell to three polls, and in 2006 and 2007 there were only 
two surveys each year. Until May 2004 the majority of respondents saw 
the military action against Iraq as the “right” thing. As the invasion be-
gan, 53 percent were in favor of the use of military force and 39 percent 
were against it. The support for the invasion reached its maximum of 
66 percent on 10 April 2003; the same survey showed the lowest oppo-
sition of 29 percent. The poll conducted after the release of pictures of 
torture of Iraqi prisoners in April 2004 showed that, for the first time, 
the majority did not support the war. The fraction of those who per-
ceived the conflict as wrong reached 60 percent in April 2007, at the 
same time the “right’”answer was given by 26 percent. 
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Poland was the only country of the three where the opponents of 
sending troops to Iraq were always in the majority. CBOS conducted 
31 surveys in which a typical sample of around 1,000 adults were asked 
“Do you support the participation of Polish soldiers in the mission in 
Iraq?”25 The initial opposition of 73 percent fell to 45 percent in May 
2003 (see Panel 2 of Figure 1). This was also the time when the support 
for sending troops to Iraq reached its peak of 45 percent. As sectarian 
violence engulfed Iraq, the Poles grew less comfortable with the coun-
try’s involvement in the military operations. The opposition bounced 
back to 70 percent in the second quarter of 2004 and exceeded 80 per-
cent in 2007.
The Australian public was asked about their opinion on the in-
volvement in the Iraq war less frequently. The most consistent survey 
was conducted by Roy Morgan between 19 March 2003 and 20 April 
2006, typically on a sample of over 500 respondents. The question 
“Now thinking about Iraq — In your opinion should Australia have 
a military presence in Iraq?” was put forward ten times (see Panel 3 of 
Figure 1). The Australian opinion remained split fairly in the middle 
over the polling period, with differences between yes and no oscillating 
between 2 percent and 5 percent. The situation changed in 2006, when 
the opposition of 59 percent exceeded the number of supporters by 
24 percentage points. Unfortunately, there are no polls available that 
could reflect the effects of revelations suggesting that the Australian 
government had sent troops to Iraq under the condition that its wheat 
trade with the country was protected.26 Notably, neither the Polish nor 
the Australian polls showed the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.27 
Data for the explanatory variables are taken chiefly from two sourc-
es: iCasualties.org and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.28 The 
latter draws from open sources and provides information on acts of 
terrorism defined as violence for political purposes by sub-national ac-
tors, designed to induce fear and anxiety in order to influence behav-
ior of an audience beyond that of immediate victims. MIPT recorded 
9,656 terrorist incidents (of which 593 were classified as international) 
that took place in Iraq between 20 March 2003 and 31 December 2007, 
and caused 26,147 fatalities.  This number represents mostly civilian 
deaths as the database concentrates on non-combatant targets; only 
0.6 percent of incidents recorded involved military targets. The inci-
dence of terrorism in Iraq seems to be particularly large when com-
pared to the overall number of 10,237 international terrorist attacks 
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recorded globally within 40 years to 2007. The number of fatalities is 
used as an explanatory variable because, although it shows the same 
effects as the number of attacks, it provides better goodness of fit of the 
model. This suggests that public does not react only to the number of 
attacks, but is also sensitive to their severity. 
iCasualties.org, also known as the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, is 
an independent online service containing information on soldier fa-
talities in the Iraq and Afghan wars. The website provides such details 
as the date of an incident, victim’s country of origin, rank, age, name 
and location of military unit, and a cause and place of death. This in-
formation is gathered from news reports and press releases issued by 
the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Central Command, the MNF, 
and the British Ministry of Defence. As of 31 August 2010, the database 
listed 4,734 fatalities in Iraq with a vast majority of 4,416 incurred by 
the United States. The United Kingdom, Poland and Australia lost 179, 
23 and 2 servicemen, respectively. The death toll in 2003 amounted to 
580 troops, including 53 British and 2 Polish combatants. During the 
four following years, MNF lost around 900 soldiers each year, followed 
by a decline to 322 and 150 fatalities in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
The period from 2004 to 2007 brought on average 30 fatalities a year 
among the British troops and 5 among the Polish. Australia incurred 
two casualties in non-hostile accidents, one in 2005 and another one 
in 2006.
Graphical analysis
Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical comparison of war opposition in 
the three countries with soldier deaths and fatalities in terrorist at-
tacks that took place in Iraq. The plots on the left-hand side present 
log of cumulative fatalities, while those on the right-hand side show 
marginal deaths, which are calculated as a number of fatalities with-
in 120 days preceding a poll date. For instance, the observation on 1 
May 2005 is a number of fatalities that occurred between that day and 
1 January 2005.29 Since Australia lost only one serviceman during the 
sample period, Panel 3 of Figure 1 shows Australian opposition scores 
with a vertical line marking the date of this event.
The swift invasion in the first weeks of the conflict was largely re-
garded as a success, which seems the most likely explanation behind 
the drop in opposition numbers in the three coalition countries. 
Thereafter, as Iraq immersed in sectarian violence and the insurgency 
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Figure 1 - Opposition to the Iraq war and soldier deaths
100
CEJISS 
1/2018 
3 Australia
101
Fatality
Sensitivity
1 United Kingdom
Figure 2 - Opposition to the Iraq war and terrorism fatalities
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gained strength, the public enthusiasm for the war diminished, which 
is reflected in the rising share of those who opposed the military op-
erations. The insurgency was associated with an increase in fatalities 
incurred by the United Kingdom and Poland, depicted as the log of 
cumulative soldier deaths and marginal fatalities in Figure 1. Nonethe-
less, the British death toll swelled during the invasion period, which 
left Poland’s forces unharmed. Great Britain suffered the highest losses 
and the fastest accumulation of fatalities among the three countries. 
The Poles started paying with their lives later in 2003, and incurred 
the highest losses in 2004 and 2005. Australia did not have any fatal 
incident until 2005.
Judging by Figure 1, British opinion seems to show signs of the “rally-
around-the-flag” effect. Although the casualties rose rapidly during the 
first weeks of the invasion, the opposition to the war appears relatively 
small (Panel 1). The lack of human losses on the Polish and Australian 
sides prevents us from drawing a similar conclusion for these coun-
tries. The plots of the log of cumulative fatalities suggest that it may 
have a potential to explain changes in the war-related public opinion. 
This is particularly true for the periods of a steady rise in opposition af-
ter summer 2004. However, the possible relationship between the log 
of cumulative fatalities and war opposition is less clear in the earlier 
periods, when the opinion is more volatile and accumulation of soldier 
deaths more rapid. The marginal fatalities, depicted on the right-hand 
side of Figure 1, may explain declines in opposition better than the log 
of cumulative casualties. This is due to the fact that, unlike cumulative 
values, marginal casualties are not monotonic and can fluctuate with 
opinion.30 The relationship between the war opinion and marginal ca-
sualties seems to be weaker in the later months, when fatalities stay 
relatively low and opposition gradually increases. Because of very few 
data points available, it is impossible to draw permitted conclusions 
from the graphical analysis of the Australian series. The most notice-
able point in Panel 3 is an increase in the war opposition following the 
first death among ADF soldiers. Nonetheless, it is hard to attribute that 
change to this fatal event as it was a non-hostile accident. It is likely 
that some other factors, beyond the scope of this article, contributed 
to changes in Australian opinion.
The three coalition countries suffered only a fraction of deaths 
incurred by the United States, whose public opinion constitutes the 
focus of most studies. Therefore, another measure of violence and in-
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stability in Iraq is introduced – a number of people killed in terrorist 
attacks. This variable is used to test the hypothesis that public in the 
coalition countries is sensitive to occurrence and intensity of terror-
ism in Iraq.31 Since soldier deaths are relatively rare, frequent and gory 
terrorist attacks are likely to occupy news services more often and as 
such may affect public opinion to a greater extent. Figure 2 demon-
strates the log of cumulative and marginal deaths from terrorist at-
tacks in Iraq. As before, the log of cumulative fatalities seems to reflect 
the overall direction of changes in public opinion fairly well. However, 
due to its monotonic nature, the variable fails to explain drops in the 
opposition, such as the one in the United Kingdom in the last quar-
ter of 2003. Marginal fatalities (for 120 days preceding a poll date) also 
appear to reflect the rise in opposition, but additionally they seem to 
mirror downward changes. For instance, the decline in the war unpop-
ularity in Britain in 2007 is mirrored by a drop in marginal fatalities. 
Even changes in Australia’s public opinion seem to somehow follow 
marginal deaths in terrorist attacks.
The graphical analysis does not provide an answer to whether the 
log of cumulative fatalities or marginal deaths is a better predictor of 
public opinion, or whether they should be used in conjunction.32 The 
problem with logged cumulative fatalities is that they continuous-
ly increase in time. Although more capable of capturing shocks and 
temporary changes in the intensity of the conflict, marginal fatalities 
may underperform in capturing long time patterns of the war. It is also 
likely that some exogenous events, for instance the terrorist atrocities 
in Madrid, the release of pictures of torture on Iraqi prisoners in 2004, 
or an election calendar, could exert a significant impact on public at-
titudes towards the war. The following section provides a more for-
mal empirical set up for analyzing the effects of the above variables on 
war-related opinion in coalition countries.
Empirical approach
Many of the previous studies on casualty sensitivity seem to ignore 
the fact that public support as well as casualty series are most likely to 
be nonstationary.33 A failure to account for nonstationarity may lead 
to spurious regressions, i.e. misleading standard errors may result in 
a model that shows a relationship that does not exist.34 A remedy to 
this problem is an error correction model (ECM), which is based on a 
notion that a true relationship will be preserved by first differencing, 
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whereas a spurious one will not survive the process.35 The model’s 
dynamic nature captures short-term shifts and long-term trends of 
public opinion in response to changes in explanatory variables, pro-
vided that variables cointegrate. This study employs a single-equa-
tion ECM which appears to be commonly used in studies of public 
opinion.36 The model relates current changes in the war opposition 
to the contemporaneous changes in the magnitude of violence, the 
extent to which the series were outside of their equilibrium relation-
ship in the previous period, and exogenous events. It may be written 
as follows:
ΔOPPOSITIONt = α0 + β1OPPOSITIONt-1 + β2ΔFATALt 
+ β3FATALt-1 + β4EVENTSt + εt, 
where FATAL is either the number of fatalities among nation’s 
soldiers or killed in terrorist attacks. EVENTS includes the end of 
the invasion of Iraq (1 May 2003), the capture of Saddam Hussein (13 
December 2003), the terrorist attack in Madrid (11 March 2004), and 
the revelation of widespread prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison 
(April 2004).37 α0 and εt are a constant and an error term, respec-
tively. 
An advantage of using ECM is the ability to capture the series’ 
permanent memory, i.e. allowing the public opinion to be perma-
nently affected by the shocks in explanatory variables. This charac-
teristic is particularly valuable as the impact of violence occurring 
in period t on public opinion may be dispersed across several fol-
lowing periods. One can imagine a situation in which an increased 
fatality rate at period t causes the war opposition to soar. Although 
the fatalities may be considerably lower in following periods, the 
public might be affected by the memory of the earlier death toll and 
unwilling to scale down their opposition. Panels 1b and 2b of Figure 
1, where large declines in marginal deaths are not followed by im-
mediate downward adjustments of opposition, suggest that such a 
scenario is plausible and a surge in fatalities may have a long lasting 
effect on the opposition series. Before the regressions could be run, 
appropriate tests were undertaken to confirm that the time series 
included in each regression are indeed cointegrated.38 The follow-
ing section presents the study’s empirical results.
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Results
Following the insights from the data section, it cannot be ruled out 
that both the log of cumulative fatalities and marginal fatalities have 
explanatory power for the changes in the war opposition. The ensuing 
discussion begins with the results based on the former measure, which 
appears to give a better overall fit than marginal fatalities.39  
Table 1 presents estimation results where FATAL is measured as a 
log of cumulative fatalities of a specific type and the dependent vari-
able, OPPOSITION, is measured on the 0–100 point metric scale. The 
National fatalities variable contains deaths incurred by either British 
or Polish troops. Model diagnostics displayed in the bottom of Table 1 
indicate that all models but one offer reasonable fit to the data. Mod-
el 4 suffers from heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan χ2 = 7.97), which 
could be attributed to the lack of explanatory power of the cumulative 
Polish fatalities. Regression coefficients behave as anticipated. The er-
ror-correction parameter (Oppositiont-1) in models 1 through 3 suggests 
that shocks to British opposition inflicted by fatalities in Iraq are grad-
ually corrected and dissipate over time. However, the interpretation of 
this coefficient is problematic due to uneven spacing of the poll data. 
Assuming that the estimates of the error correction parameter are 
correct and interpretable, a conventional analysis would indicate that 
shocks in model 3 are corrected at a rate of 98 percent, which means 
that only 2 percent of an effect remains after one period and 0.04 per-
cent after two periods. Thus, although the public does not forget past 
fatalities when forming opinion, their effect dies out relatively fast. In 
four models, mostly on Poland’s side of Table 1, the error correction 
parameter is less than -1, suggesting a possibility of the hypersensitive 
nature of public opinion to fatalities. Model 5 explains the highest pro-
portion of variability in the Polish series and appears to provide the 
best fit. It suggests that shocks to long-run equilibrium between the 
opposition and fatalities in terrorist attacks are corrected at a rate of 
104 percent. Thus, the Polish public “overreacts” to the news of fatal-
ities by 4 percent within the first period. This is then corrected over 
ensuing periods, with a 0.16 percent correction after two periods, a 
negligible overcorrection after three periods, and eventually reaching 
the long-run equilibrium state. As models 2 and 5 indicate, the pub-
lic in both countries responds to terrorism intensity in Iraq, howev-
er, the Poles seem to be more sensitive to incoming information. This 
could be caused by the fact that never before had Poland contributed 
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to a military mission abroad on such a scale, and the public could be 
paying more attention to this novelty, seeing news of victims as more 
sensational than people in war-experienced Britain. Similarly, Poles’ 
long-run hypersensitivity to the number of terrorism victims may be 
influenced by the fact that Poland has no experience of international 
Table 1 - ECM estimates based on logged cumulative fatalities
 United Kingdom Poland
1 2 3 4 5 6
Oppositiont-1 -0.89
**
(0.16)
-0.67**
(0.14)
-0.98**
(0.16)
-0.94**
(0.19)
-1.04**
(0.13)
-0.87**
(0.15)
Δ Ln National 
fatalitiest
15.94**
(5.28)
9.68
(5.00)
-2.88
(5.10)
-6.73
(3.35)
Ln National
fatalitiest-1
9.56**
(3.08)
1.94
(3.79)
2.46
(1.93)
-2.3
(1.60)
Δ Ln Terrorismt 1.27
*
(0.64)
1.39*
(0.68)
2.12
(1.34)
3.19*
(1.54)
Ln Terrorismt-1 0.98
*
(0.43)
1.87**
(0.73)
3.47**
(0.59)
3.51**
(0.71)
End of invasion 0.18
(1.96)
0.34
(2.15)
-13.16*
(6.18)
-25.98**
(4.77)
-24.95**
(4.94)
Capture of Saddam -3.51
(2.01)
-3.43
(2.18)
-6.01**
(2.11)
-0.07
(4.02)
-5.68*
(2.71)
Torture / 
March 11
8.52**
(2.31)
7.86**
(2.42)
8.96**
(2.12)
9.28*
(4.40)
9.19**
(2.78)
8.68**
(2.91)
Constant -0.78
(7.80)
22.66**
(4.54)
24.45*
(11.61)
67.12**
(14.97)
69.32**
(9.93)
56.55**
(11.64)
Model diagnostics
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.35 0.50 0.48 0.75 0.74
Ljung-Box Q Test 3.23 4.63 4.84 4.63 1.91 5.59
Breusch-Pagan χ2 0.06 2.39 1.70 7.97† 1.16 0.71
ARCH χ2 (1) 0.03 1.66 0.45 0.49 0.09 0.80
Skewness/Kurtosis 
χ2
1.14 0.53 0.62 2.68 0.73 0.27
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 39 for the UK and 31 for Poland. *p ≤ .05, 
**p ≤ .01. One-tailed tests.  † significant heteroscedasticity.
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terrorism and going to Iraq was perceived by many as an invitation 
for Islamic extremists to launch attacks in the country that considers 
itself terrorism-free. According to polls conducted between June 2003 
and October 2007, on average 75 percent of respondents deemed that 
due to its involvement in Iraq, Poland would become a target of such 
attacks. In October 2004, when 82 percent of Poles feared terrorist at-
tacks, the British public seemed a little bit less concerned. “Only” 56 
percent felt less safe as a result of the war.40 Thriving terrorism in Iraq 
seemed likely to contribute to those fears and consequently increase 
the war opposition.
British war opposition
Model 1 implies that increases in cumulative British soldier deaths 
have a significant contemporaneous effect on the public, with a 1 per-
cent increase in fatalities being followed by a 0.16 percent rise in war 
opposition (β2 = 15.94). A positive lagged coefficient confirms that an 
increase in fatalities in current period will have an effect on opposition 
over subsequent periods too. A long-run multiplier of 10.74, shown 
in Table 2, informs us that the total short- and long-run effect of a 1 
percent increase in fatalities gives a boost of 0.1 percent to war oppo-
sition. Although these values may seem small at first, they translate 
into substantial fatality sensitivity. For example, a change from 10 to 
20 fatalities is associated with a 10 percent increase in war opposition. 
Model 2 tests whether deaths from terrorist attacks could have an 
impact on the war opposition in the United Kingdom. The estimates 
give an affirmative answer to that question and show that increases in 
terrorism contribute to a rise in war opposition. Finally, model 3 con-
siders both measures of violence simultaneously. It strongly confirms 
Table 2 - Long-run multipliers for the log model
 United Kingdom Poland
National fatalities 10.74**
(2.02)
-
Terrorism 1.46**
(0.43)
3.34**
(0.95)
Note: Standard errors computed using Bewley (1983) transformation in parentheses. 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01. One-tailed tests.
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the significance of the short- and long-run impact of terrorist violence 
on the war-related opinion in the United Kingdom. The impact of Brit-
ish fatalities is reduced to a short-run effect that is significant only at a 
10 percent confidence level. 
Polish war opposition
Models 4 and 5 offer a sequential introduction of the two violence vari-
ables and their impact on the Polish war opposition. One cannot make 
an inference about the effects of fatalities among Polish soldiers, as 
the coefficients never reach significant levels. Nevertheless, it does not 
mean that the Polish opinion is insensitive to losses among its troops. 
The model might not pick up any effects because deaths among Polish 
soldiers are relatively few (23 over a five year period). The regressions 
return a positive effect on opposition caused by changes in the series 
depicting cumulative fatalities in terrorist incidents. The total effect 
given by the long-run multiplier in Table 2 suggests that 1 percent in-
crease in terrorism leads to a boost in war opposition by approximately 
0.03 percent. Model 6, which includes both terrorism and Polish sol-
dier fatalities, confirms the influence of terrorism. 
Effect of selected events
Table 1 also provides estimates of changes in war opposition induced 
by selected events. The end of the Iraq invasion in early May 2003 
coincided with a significant reduction in opposition in Poland. The 
rapid defeat of the Iraqi regime was perceived as a major success and 
the country did not lose any of its troops during that phase, which 
seems to explain the 26 percent drop in the opposition numbers. 
Similarly, the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, another 
success of the military operations, reduced the British opposition by 
approximately 5 percent, and had a less evident impact in Poland. All 
models in Table 1 confirm significance of the “Torture/March 11” vari-
able, which encompasses effects of the terrorist attack in Madrid in 
March 2004 and the release of the Abu Ghraib torture pictures. The 
temporal proximity of those two events and frequency with which 
polls were being conducted prevent from distinguishing between 
their individual effects. The growth in opposition could be attributed 
to one or both of the following effects. First, the evidence of soldiers’ 
misconduct may have increased the dislike of the war among those 
members of the public who believed that the war was about improv-
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ing Iraqi lives and freeing them from brutal dictatorship. Second, the 
March 11 bombings, which were perceived to be a result of Spain’s 
involvement in Iraq, may have increased the fears among the British 
and Polish public of being punished for the countries’ war participa-
tion with similar attacks. Thus, one cannot rule out that the March 11 
Table 3 - ECM estimates based on marginal fatalities
United Kingdom Poland Australia
1 2 3 4 5
Opposition
t-
1 -0.59**
(0.14)
-0.82**
(0.16)
-0.86**
(0.18)
-1.12**
(0.16)
-0.96*
(0.29)
Δ Mrg National 
fatalitiest
-0.03
(0.16)
-0.41
(0.77)
Mrg National fatal-
itiest-1
-0.10
(0.09)
-0.39
(0.48)
Δ Mrg Terrorismt 0.004
*
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.01
(0.01)
Mrg Terrorismt-1 0.003
*
(0.001)
0.005**
(0.001)
0.007**
(0.01)
End of invasion 3.60
(1.96)
4.07*
(1.57)
-11.84
(6.41)
-16.46**
(5.39)
Capture of Saddam -3.35
(2.48)
-2.11
(1.97)
1.20
(3.84)
0.20
(3.11)
Torture / March 11 8.80**
(2.62)
8.15**
(2.34)
13.69**
(4.21)
11.22**
(3.41)
Constant 23.00**
(5.89)
29.15**
(5.94)
60.87**
(14.07)
79.75**
(12.65)
43.56*
(13.88)
Model diagnostics
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.39 0.41 0.60 0.80
Ljung-Box Q Test 3.21 2.68 2.32 3.91 2.99
Breusch-Pagan χ2 0.47 0.04 10.68† 4.96† 0.14
ARCH χ2 (1) 1.56 0.76 0.93 0.27 0.01
Skewness/
Kurtosis χ2
1.04 0.82 3.29 0.25 0.90
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 39 for the UK, 31 for Poland and 10 for Australia. 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.  † denotes present heteroskedasticity
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attack boosted opposition by increasing the number of those de-
manding withdrawal from Iraq.
Marginal fatalities
Table 3 presents estimates based on marginal fatalities representing 
the number of deaths of a given type that occurred within 120 days pri-
or to a poll date. Models 2, 4 and 5 bear out the sizeable impact of the 
intensity of terrorism in Iraq on British, Polish and Australian opinion. 
Nonetheless, the estimates fail to confirm any effects caused by soldier 
fatalities. This suggests that only cumulative fatalities matter, because 
the media typically reports deaths as totals since the beginning of the 
war.41 Hence, the public may not be aware how many troops were killed 
within a 120-day window. Similarly, respondents are unlikely to know 
precisely how many people died in terrorist incidents, but frequent and 
severe attacks are likely to influence wartime opinion through regular 
and nearly everyday appearance in news reports. Over the analyzed 
polling period, Iraq was a stage to an average of six terrorist incidents 
a day, which claimed 15 lives. They were bound to make a more fre-
quent news appearance than deaths of soldiers, which happened at an 
average rate of one in 10 and 75 days for the British and Polish forces, 
respectively. In addition, since MIPT records are based on open sourc-
es, such as international news services, the database should somewhat 
reflect the media content reaching the public. Thus, the intensity of 
terrorism could be a signal of war progress, which dominates other 
cost measures when soldier fatalities are relatively rare. 
The analysis of the Australian war opposition is hindered by the 
small number of data points – the most frequent and consistent poll 
was conducted only ten times.42 This data limitation, coupled with the 
lack of combat deaths among the Australian troops, restricts the scope 
of investigation as well as its reliability. Nonetheless, the estimation 
coefficients shown in model 5 of Table 3 indicate a positive relationship 
between the Australian war opposition and terrorism.43 These esti-
mates add to the evidence of a significant long-run impact of terrorism 
intensity on opinion in the coalition countries. 
Discussion
The above results offer a number of implications. First, in the absence 
of frequent soldier fatalities, which constitute the most obvious cost of 
armed conflict to a nation, the public is likely to respond to perceived 
112
CEJISS 
1/2018 
success of a mission measured by the ability or inability to bring peace 
and stability to a troubled nation. Since the Iraq war was framed as a 
part of the war on terror, swelling numbers of terrorist incidents and 
fatalities may serve as an indicator that the coalition efforts are failing. 
In addition, some members of the public may have been convinced 
that attacks are a direct result of the MNF presence in Iraq and there-
fore their support or ambivalence to the war was turned into opposi-
tion. Furthermore, mounting terrorist casualties may be interpreted as 
a signal that the cost of achieving war objectives is too high in terms 
of Iraqi lives. All this leads to a conclusion that the public in coalition 
countries is sensitive not only to fatalities of their own troops but also 
to the deaths of Iraqis. 
Second, the public seems to be forming opinion in a consistent and 
rational way, which requires a cost-benefit analysis of the likely war 
outcome.44 Although the public might have too little information to 
make complex cost-benefit calculations, it is possible that such an 
analysis is not based on precise knowledge of costs and combat situ-
ation, but rather on public’s perception of these. Relatively low losses 
associated with the invasion and its high perceived success caused the 
opposition to deteriorate. This drop may have been helped by people’s 
desire to be seen as supporting “our troops,” and favorable media ac-
counts. This could have been helped by the fact that nearly two out 
of three news reports showed coalition troops being welcomed by 
Iraqi people.45 At the same time they avoided showing graphic imag-
es of death and destruction, helping the public to overlook the costs. 
The gap between perceived expected costs and benefits was further 
tipped in favor of the latter by politicians’ attempts to portray the war 
as a move to preempt future aggression and terrorist attacks against 
the West. Nonetheless, perceived benefits were soon readjusted in re-
sponse to the evaporation of the main reason for the war, WMD. Con-
sequently, the campaign became more of a humanitarian venture and 
less of an endeavour to defend coalition countries’ interests. When the 
costs started mounting and the vision of success became diluted by 
escalating insurgency, public opposition started rising. This tenden-
cy may have been reinforced by episodes of soldier misconduct, for 
instance in Abu Ghraib, which on one hand contributed to the cost 
side of the equation by compromising the Western values and increas-
ing the risk of retaliatory attacks, and on the other may have made 
the public question the gains of freedom and democracy that Iraqis 
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were expected to enjoy. Overall, the benefit side has been depreciat-
ing throughout the entire military campaign because the citizenry of 
the supporting states have observed a growing divergence between the 
war and their national interests. Hence, sluggish progress and swelling 
casualties may have led the public to the conclusion that the “lesser 
extent” of democracy in Iraq would have been an acceptable price for 
avoiding additional bloodshed.
Third, the citizenry in the coalition countries could feel less limited 
in joining war opposition than their American counterparts because 
of a wider range of alternatives. A withdrawal of a coalition member 
would not necessarily mean that the war was lost or that Iraq would 
immerse in even greater violence. Most likely, the United States would 
keep the situation under control. If not, a failure could still be largely 
blamed on the United States. A penalty for the “defector” would be 
limited mostly to strained relations with America and uncertainty of 
future defense alliances, which at the time may have been difficult to 
assess, and consequently seem as a low price to pay for bringing troops 
home. A withdrawal of the coalition leader would be associated with 
very different and much graver consequences, including the destabili-
zation of Iraq and a loss of the superpower’s credibility. Additionally, 
America’s premature exit from Iraq would energize Islamist militants, 
who would see it as a victory. This highlights the distinction between 
choices facing the public in the United States and in other MNF coun-
tries.
Finally, the results appear to support the “Iraq syndrome”46 whereby 
controversies surrounding the campaign and its high death toll have 
made the public more suspicious and less supportive of similar ven-
tures.  This was reflected in rapidly escalating war opposition across 
the MNF countries. The main contributor to the public mistrust was 
the failure to find WMD. However, scandals of soldier misconduct, 
such as Abu Ghraib, also must have played a role. The three coalition 
countries had their share of damaging allegations as well. Public trust 
in Britain was dented by accusations against Prime Minister Tony Blair 
of deliberately misleading the public on the evidence of Iraq’s posses-
sion of WMD. The Australian public was outraged with the news that 
the reason for which the country joined the war was to protect its lu-
crative wheat trade. The Polish government was trapped in allegations 
of housing secret CIA prisons, where suspected terrorists had been tor-
tured. Thus, the war and associated events have been likely to make the 
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public question not only whether they can trust the United States, but 
also whether they can believe their own governments. Consequently, 
this will make convincing the citizenry to deploy troops abroad more 
difficult and hinder involvement in future military interventions. This 
may have been already observed in the attitudes towards the conflicts 
in Libya and Syria.
Summary
This study uses opinion polls from the United Kingdom, Poland and 
Australia to analyze fatality sensitivity of war-related public opinion 
in coalition countries, i.e. those that participate in military efforts 
but are not a leading force. The analysis based on the error correc-
tion model does not provide conclusive evidence on sensitivity to 
soldier deaths, which can be confirmed to some extent only for the 
British series. However, there is evidence that the public in the three 
coalition countries is sensitive to deaths in terrorist attacks in Iraq, 
which highlights the urgency of devising war strategies that tackle 
this form of violence in a more efficient way. Intensity of terrorism 
may be considered as a measure of success of the war efforts as well as 
a contributor to the war costs. Therefore, public responsiveness here 
implies that the opinion is formed through a cost-benefit analysis. 
The expected benefits were never high as the war participation was a 
policy choice, and not a necessity to defend homelands. The distant 
enemy that did not appear blatantly dangerous meant that the public 
placed smaller value on the stakes in Iraq. This may have translated 
into higher sensitivity to human losses evoked by the unexpectedly 
long and costly conflict. The very different nature of political and 
military involvement of the coalition countries was linked to their 
responsibility and risks being lesser than those of the coalition lead-
er. Thus, their pullout from the combat mission would have been 
unlikely to impair the overall war outcome and as such gave those 
countries more flexibility in forming their opinions and exit strate-
gies. A lower cost of a potential withdrawal could have made it easier 
to join war opposition.
The study confirms the validity of using the logarithm of cumulative 
fatalities as an explanatory variable in wartime opinion models. This is 
because the opposition exhibited an upward tendency, which is cap-
tured rather well by the monotonic nature of cumulative fatalities. The 
reversal of the increase in opposition was almost impossible because 
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the reasons for the intervention had been proven nonexistent and the 
coalition soon became implicated in numerous errors and scandals.
The error correction specification shows that the public does not base 
their opinion only on the most recent changes in the fatality series, but 
is likely to take into account developments in earlier periods too. The 
possibility that the public employs a long-term perspective when form-
ing opinion has implications for policymakers. First, together with the 
cost-benefit analysis it confirms the public’s rational approach to the 
war. Second, governments should avoid taking offhand and populist de-
cisions under pressure of a moment and rather wait for the opposition 
to re-equilibrate. Third, they should make an effort to keep a number of 
war-related lapses and backslidings at minimum because, as the example 
of Abu Ghraib shows, they are costly in terms of support ratings. Howev-
er, once an oversight happens, policymakers should try to convince the 
public that it was a one-off accident, for example through an appropriate 
investigation into causes, improved checks, guidelines, etc. A failure to 
do so is likely to deepen the damage in the war support because the ad-
verse effect would die out more slowly than if the public was convinced 
that a future risk of such events was small. Fourth, long public memory 
may have led to the development of the Iraq syndrome, which is likely to 
hinder future military interventions, as public will be more suspicious of 
evidence and arguments presented by policymakers in support for com-
mitting a country to war.

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